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Fixed some typos and formatting issues in docs

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Jameson Finney
2016-01-30 22:37:28 -05:00
parent 594fc43a85
commit 8ec50f11cd
24 changed files with 52 additions and 53 deletions
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doc/Extensions/Two-Factor-Auth.md
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@@ -28,14 +28,14 @@ The underlying HMAC-SHA1 remains the same for both types, security advantages or
Like the name suggests, this type uses the current Time or a subset of it to generate the passcodes.
These passcodes solely rely on the secrecy of their Secretkey in order to provide passcodes.
An attacker only needs to guess that Secretkey and the other variable part is any given time, presumably the time upon login.
RFC4226 suggests a resynchronization attempt in case the passcode mismatches, providing the attacker a range of upto +/- 3 Minutes to create passcodes.
RFC4226 suggests a resynchronization attempt in case the passcode mismatches, providing the attacker a range of up to +/- 3 Minutes to create passcodes.
## <a name="hotp">Counterbased One-Time-Password (TOTP)</a>
This type uses an internal counter that needs to be in sync with the server's counter to successfully authenticate the passcodes.
The main advantage over timebased OTP is the attacker doesn't only need to know the Secretkey but also the server's Counter in order to create valid passcodes.
RFC4226 suggests a resynchronization attempt in case the passcode mismatches, providing the attacker a range of upto +4 increments from the actual counter to create passcodes.
RFC4226 suggests a resynchronization attempt in case the passcode mismatches, providing the attacker a range of up to +4 increments from the actual counter to create passcodes.
# <a name="config">Configuration</a>