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Fix #299/#300/#301: gate Sentinel proxy routes with require_local_operator
Reported by @tg12 in three audit issues opened the same day: #299 — POST /api/sentinel/token is an unauthenticated Copernicus OAuth relay for caller-supplied client_id/secret. #300 — POST /api/sentinel/tile is an unauthenticated quota/bandwidth relay for Sentinel Hub Process API tile fetches. #301 — GET /api/sentinel2/search is an unauthenticated Planetary Computer STAC + Esri imagery search relay. All three lived in backend/routers/tools.py decorated only with @limiter.limit(...) — no Depends(require_local_operator). That made the backend a free anonymous relay for any caller's Sentinel / Planetary Computer queries, in the same shape we already closed for #240/#241 (oracle resolve) and #211/#213/#214 (thermal verify, OpenMHZ calls + audio relay). Fix: add dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)] to each route. Loopback / Docker-bridge / admin-key callers (the operator dashboard) are unaffected — they still resolve through the same allowlist used by every other operator-only helper in this file. Anonymous remote callers now receive 403 BEFORE any outbound HTTP call to Copernicus or Planetary Computer happens. Tests ----- test_sentinel_routes_auth_gate.py — 8 new tests: * anonymous-remote → 403 on all three routes * NO upstream HTTP call when the gate fires (asserted via MagicMock(side_effect=AssertionError) on requests.post and services.sentinel_search.search_sentinel2_scene). This is the property that makes the gate real — without it, a 403 returned after the upstream call still burns quota. * 127.0.0.1 loopback caller reaches the handler (no false-positive where the gate accidentally blocks the local operator too). * Uses raw ASGITransport(client=(peer_ip, ...)) rather than FastAPI's TestClient because TestClient reports client.host as "testclient" which is not on the loopback allowlist. test_control_surface_auth.py — extended the existing parameterised regression with the three new routes. That regression is the global "no remote control surface ships without auth" guard for the whole codebase; adding these to it means a future refactor that drops the dependency from any of them will fail CI alongside the existing ~30 gated routes. The egress-on-403 property and the parameterised regression together give two independent proofs that the gate fires before the upstream network call, even if FastAPI's internal dependant tree shape changes across versions (an earlier draft of this PR included a static walker of the route table; it was removed because behavioural evidence is strictly stronger and version-independent).
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@@ -85,7 +85,30 @@ async def api_geocode_reverse(
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return await asyncio.to_thread(reverse_geocode, lat, lng, local_only)
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@router.get("/api/sentinel2/search")
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# ── Sentinel proxy routes (Issue #299/#300/#301, reported by tg12) ──────────
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# These three endpoints relay external Sentinel / Planetary Computer
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# requests through the backend to avoid browser CORS blocks. They are
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# operator-only helpers — they MUST NOT be callable by anonymous remote
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# users, because:
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#
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# * /api/sentinel/token — caller supplies their own Sentinel client_id +
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# client_secret. Without operator gating, the backend becomes a free
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# anonymous OAuth-mint relay for any Copernicus account.
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# * /api/sentinel/tile — same shape as the token route but for tile
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# imagery. Without gating, the backend acts as an anonymous quota and
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# bandwidth relay for Sentinel Hub Process API calls.
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# * /api/sentinel2/search — hits the Planetary Computer STAC search API
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# and falls back to Esri imagery. No caller credentials are involved,
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# but the route is still an anonymous external-search relay. We gate
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# it the same way for consistency with the rest of the operator-only
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# helper surface.
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#
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# Gating is via require_local_operator (loopback / bridge / admin key),
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# matching the same allowlist already used by /api/region-dossier and
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# the other operator helpers further up this file. Single-operator nodes
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# see no behavior change — their dashboard already lives on loopback or
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# the trusted Docker bridge, so it still resolves.
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@router.get("/api/sentinel2/search", dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)])
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@limiter.limit("30/minute")
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def api_sentinel2_search(
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request: Request,
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@@ -97,7 +120,7 @@ def api_sentinel2_search(
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return search_sentinel2_scene(lat, lng)
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@router.post("/api/sentinel/token")
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@router.post("/api/sentinel/token", dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)])
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@limiter.limit("60/minute")
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async def api_sentinel_token(request: Request):
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"""Proxy Copernicus CDSE OAuth2 token request (avoids browser CORS block)."""
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@@ -152,7 +175,7 @@ import os as _os
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_SH_TOKEN_CACHE_HMAC_KEY = _os.urandom(32)
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@router.post("/api/sentinel/tile")
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@router.post("/api/sentinel/tile", dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)])
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@limiter.limit("300/minute")
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async def api_sentinel_tile(request: Request):
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"""Proxy Sentinel Hub Process API tile request (avoids CORS block)."""
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