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12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 BigBodyCobain
|
31ebcb5cd9 |
Infonet sync: honor HTTP 429 Retry-After + exponential backoff
Fixes the retry-storm that's been keeping the local node 429'd out of
the seed peer (the diagnosis we ran earlier in the session). Pre-fix:
1. Sync hits the seed peer, gets HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests)
2. _peer_sync_response stringifies the status into a ValueError
3. _sync_from_peer catches it, error becomes the str() of the exc
4. _run_public_sync_cycle calls finish_sync(error=..., failure_backoff_s=60)
5. next_sync_due_at = now + 60s
6. After 60s, sync runs again, hits same upstream that hasn't reset
its rate-limit bucket, 429 again. Loop indefinitely.
Net effect: a node that hit one transient 429 would hammer the seed
every 60s forever, keeping the bucket full and never recovering. We
saw this in the live status dump: consecutive_failures=49,
last_sync_ok_at=0, retry storm sustained over the entire uptime.
What changed
------------
services/mesh/mesh_infonet_sync_support.py
* New typed exception PeerSyncRateLimited carries the parsed
Retry-After value out of the HTTP layer instead of stringifying
everything into a generic ValueError.
* New parse_retry_after_header() handles both RFC 7231 §7.1.3
forms (delay-seconds and HTTP-date). Clamped at 1 hour so a
hostile peer can't silence us for days.
* New _failure_backoff_seconds() helper computes the next delay
as max(exponential, retry_after_s). Schedule with default
base=60s, cap=1800s:
failure 1 -> 60s (preserves pre-fix for transient blips)
failure 2 -> 120s
failure 3 -> 240s
failure 4 -> 480s
failure 5 -> 960s
failure 6+ -> 1800s (capped at 30 min)
cap_s=0 explicitly disables exponential entirely — operators
who want pure-Retry-After behavior have that option.
* finish_sync now accepts retry_after_s and failure_backoff_cap_s
kwargs. Backward-compatible: existing callers that don't pass
retry_after_s get the same first-failure delay as before (the
base value), only repeat failures grow.
main.py
* _peer_sync_response detects 429 specifically, parses the
Retry-After header, raises PeerSyncRateLimited(retry_after_s=N).
Includes the response body prefix in the message so the
operator's last_error finally shows something useful.
* _sync_from_peer extended to return (ok, error, forked,
retry_after_s) — the 4th tuple element is non-zero only when
the upstream sent a parseable Retry-After. Existing call shape
preserved: the lone caller in _run_public_sync_cycle was
updated in the same commit.
* _run_public_sync_cycle forwards retry_after_s into finish_sync.
Tests
-----
backend/tests/mesh/test_infonet_sync_429_backoff.py — 17 new tests:
TestParseRetryAfter (7):
- integer seconds form
- HTTP-date form (computed as seconds-from-now)
- HTTP-date in the past returns 0
- empty / whitespace returns 0
- malformed returns 0
- clamps to 1 hour (hostile-peer cap)
- negative returns 0
TestFailureBackoffSeconds (5):
- exponential growth schedule pins each level
- retry_after wins when larger than exponential
- exponential wins when larger than retry_after
- cap_s=0 disables exponential entirely
- zero inputs return zero
TestFinishSyncBackoff (5):
- first failure uses base unchanged (pre-fix back-compat)
- consecutive_failures actually grow the delay
- retry_after honored at low failure count
- success resets consecutive_failures
- last_error carries the HTTP status / Retry-After detail
All 24 existing sync-support / status-gate tests still pass. Other
failures in tests/mesh/ are pre-existing on origin/main and unrelated
to this change (verified by running the same tests against the
user's main worktree without these edits).
What the operator sees after this lands + a docker rebuild
----------------------------------------------------------
With the live 429 storm we diagnosed:
Pre-fix: consecutive_failures keeps climbing 1/min forever,
last_error empty or generic
Post-fix: consecutive_failures grows, next_sync_due_at backs off
exponentially (max 30 min), last_error explicitly carries
"HTTP 429 from <peer> (retry_after=Ns): <body>" so the
operator can see what's actually wrong. Once the upstream
bucket drains and a sync succeeds, consecutive_failures
resets to 0 and the schedule returns to the normal 300s
interval.
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
401f114e4f |
DM mailbox: outbound replication + receiving endpoint
Second commit on this branch (first added the per-sender cap + accept_replica primitive). This commit wires the actual cross-node propagation: Outbound (sender side) ---------------------- * New ``DMRelay._replicate_envelope_to_peers_async()`` — fire-and-forget thread that POSTs the envelope to every authenticated relay peer via the same per-peer HMAC pattern gate-message replication uses (#256 ``X-Peer-Url`` + ``X-Peer-HMAC`` headers, ``resolve_peer_key_for_url``). * ``deposit()`` now calls the replication helper after a successful local accept. Per-peer errors are swallowed — slow Tor peers must not block the sender's UX, and the recipient polling from a healthy peer works fine even if some peers are down. * Metrics: dm_replication_push_ok / _rejected / _error. Inbound (receiving side) ------------------------ * New endpoint ``POST /api/mesh/dm/replicate-envelope`` in routers/mesh_peer_sync.py. * Same HMAC auth gate (``_verify_peer_push_hmac``) as the existing infonet/gate peer-push endpoints. Unauthenticated requests get 403. * Body cap of 64 KB (DM envelope is bounded by MESH_DM_MAX_MSG_BYTES). * Calls DMRelay.accept_replica which enforces the per-sender cap as a network rule — hostile sender's relay can hold extras locally but honest peers reject them on inbound replication. End-to-end flow now works ------------------------- 1. Alice's node accepts a deposit to Bob's mailbox (local cap check). 2. Alice's node spawns a background thread that POSTs the envelope to MESH_RELAY_PEERS with per-peer HMAC. 3. Each peer's /api/mesh/dm/replicate-envelope verifies the HMAC and calls accept_replica, which re-enforces the per-sender cap. 4. Bob (offline at the time of send) eventually logs into ANY node in MESH_RELAY_PEERS, his existing pollDmMailboxes pulls from the local mailbox there, finds Alice's envelope, decrypts. Tests ----- backend/tests/test_dm_replicate_envelope_endpoint.py — 4 tests: TestReplicateEndpointAuth: - rejects requests without peer HMAC (403) - rejects requests with WRONG peer HMAC (403) — confirms the HMAC is actually verified, not just present - rejects oversize bodies (>64 KB) with 400/413 TestReplicateEndpointRegistered: - static check that POST /api/mesh/dm/replicate-envelope is registered on app.routes — catches future refactor that drops the router include All 38 backend tests touching the new code paths still pass: test_dm_relay_per_sender_cap.py (14) test_dm_replicate_envelope_endpoint.py (4) test_no_new_duplicate_routes.py (1) — new route is unique test_per_peer_secret_resolver.py (19) — HMAC primitive unaffected What's still ahead (PR-3+) -------------------------- * ack propagation: when recipient pulls a message on node X, peers Y/Z should prune their copies to free the sender's quota network-wide. Without this, the sender's quota frees only on the node the recipient actually polled — other peers still see N pending until TTL expiry. Workable but suboptimal. PR-3 will add a /api/mesh/dm/ack endpoint with the same HMAC pattern. * recipient pull-from-peers: today the recipient's poll only hits their own node's relay. If they log into a peer they didn't deposit with, they need a way to fetch envelopes from other peers in MESH_RELAY_PEERS. Today this works as long as the recipient's current node is one of the peers Alice's node pushed to — which is true in a fully-meshed deployment but not guaranteed for partial meshes. PR-4 if telemetry shows this matters. |
||
|
BigBodyCobain
|
79b39e8985 |
DM mailbox: per-(sender, recipient) anti-spam cap + replication primitives
Foundation work for cross-node DM mailbox replication. Adds the network
rule that makes the replication safe to ship next, plus the primitives
the outbound replication PR will call.
The rule
--------
A single sender can have at most N UNACKED messages parked in a single
recipient's mailbox at any one time. Default N=2, tunable via
``MESH_DM_PENDING_PER_SENDER_LIMIT``. Once the recipient pulls (acks) a
message, the sender's quota for that (sender, recipient) pair frees up.
Network rule, not local rule
----------------------------
The cap is enforced TWICE:
1. ``DMRelay.deposit(...)`` — local check on the sender's own node.
Refuses to spool the (N+1)th message before it can be replicated.
2. ``DMRelay.accept_replica(...)`` — replication-acceptance check on
every receiving peer. Refuses to accept an inbound replica that
would put the local mailbox over the cap.
The second half is what makes the rule a NETWORK rule. A hostile sender
could patch out the deposit check on their own relay and continue to
spool extras locally — but those extras can never propagate, because
every honest peer enforces the same cap on the way in. A recipient who
polls from honest peers therefore never sees more than N pending from
any one sender, regardless of how many spam attempts the hostile
sender's relay accepted.
New API surface on ``DMRelay``
------------------------------
_per_sender_pending_limit() — reads MESH_DM_PENDING_PER_SENDER_LIMIT
_per_sender_pending_count(...) — counts unacked from a sender for a mailbox
accept_replica(envelope=...) — peer-push receive entry point
envelope_for_replication(...) — helper to extract a wire-form envelope
``accept_replica`` is idempotent on duplicate ``msg_id`` (replication
round-trips and multi-path delivery don't double-spool).
``envelope_for_replication`` exposes the exact shape ``accept_replica``
expects, so the follow-up PR (outbound replication wiring) just has to
fetch the envelope and POST it to authenticated peer URLs with the
existing per-peer HMAC pattern from #256.
Why this is PR-1 of two
-----------------------
The full cross-node mailbox replication needs three pieces:
A. cap enforcement on deposit (in this PR)
B. cap enforcement on replica acceptance (in this PR)
C. outbound: push envelope to MESH_RELAY_PEERS after deposit (NEXT PR)
(A) + (B) shipped together close the cap-bypass attack surface BEFORE
(C) introduces the actual cross-node propagation. Shipping them in the
other order would briefly let extras propagate during the window between
"outbound push lands" and "accept_replica cap lands."
Tests
-----
backend/tests/test_dm_relay_per_sender_cap.py — 14 tests:
TestDepositCap:
- first 2 deposits succeed (UX baseline)
- 3rd from same sender rejected with friendly message
- different senders have independent quotas
- different recipients have independent quotas
- ack frees the quota (after recipient pulls, sender can deposit again)
- cap is env-tunable
TestAcceptReplicaCap:
- replica accepted under cap
- idempotent on duplicate msg_id (no double-spool, no rejection)
- rejected at cap with structured ``cap_violation`` marker so
sender's relay can stop retrying
- per-sender, not per-mailbox: different sender_block_ref passes
even when another sender at the same mailbox is capped
- malformed envelope shapes rejected without crash
TestEnvelopeForReplication:
- returns the envelope for stored messages
- returns None for unknown msg_id
- round-trips through accept_replica end-to-end (proves the wire
shape matches across the two sides)
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
9ef02dd06f |
Fix #296: reject backend venvs missing uvicorn before launch
Reported by @f3n3k on Windows native install path. Symptom:
C:\001\backend\venv\Scripts\python.exe: No module named uvicorn
[backend] exited with 1
ShadowBroker has stopped. Exit code: 1
Root cause
----------
The Windows Start.bat flow chains:
Start.bat
└─ scripts\run-windows-runtime.ps1
└─ frontend\scripts\dev-all.cjs
└─ start-backend.js
└─ backend\venv\Scripts\python.exe -m uvicorn main:app
`start-backend.js` decided whether an existing `backend\venv` was usable
by calling `canRun(candidate, ["-V"])`. That only checks whether Python
itself can run — it does NOT check whether the backend's actual runtime
dependencies are installed.
When the venv exists but `pip install` never finished (partial install,
failed network, interrupted bootstrap, etc.), the launcher happily
accepted that broken venv, then died with the exact error f3n3k
reported.
Fix
---
New `canRunBackendPython()` helper that requires BOTH:
python -V # Python is runnable
python -c "import fastapi, uvicorn" # backend deps are installed
Used in two call sites:
* `ensureBackendVenv()` — when iterating candidate venvs on first
launch, reject any venv whose Python can't import the backend's
real entry-point deps. The launcher then falls through to its
existing rebuild path (`rebuildBackendVenv`) which reinstalls deps
before declaring the venv healthy.
* `rebuildBackendVenv()` — after a rebuild attempt, verify the deps
are present before returning the new interpreter path. Catches
silent partial rebuilds.
The check is the import that uvicorn itself would do at startup, so a
green return here genuinely means "uvicorn will start". Cost is one
extra `python -c` per venv candidate on launcher startup — milliseconds.
Verified locally with `node --check start-backend.js`.
Credit: @f3n3k for the original report.
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
f91ddcf38b |
Fix #302: split OpenClaw HMAC reveal into dedicated POST with no-store
Reported by @tg12. Pre-fix, two problems lived on the GET endpoint:
1. `GET /api/ai/connect-info?reveal=true` returned the full HMAC
secret in the response body on every Connect modal open. Even
gated to require_local_operator, that put the secret into
browser history, dev-tools network panels, browser disk caches,
HAR exports, and screen captures.
2. The same GET endpoint auto-bootstrapped (generated + persisted)
the secret on a mere read. Side effects on a GET are a footgun:
browser prefetchers, mirror tools, and casual curl-from-history
would all silently mint+persist a fresh secret.
Backend (backend/routers/ai_intel.py)
-------------------------------------
GET /api/ai/connect-info — always returns the MASKED
fingerprint (first6 + bullets
+ last4). No `?reveal` param.
NO auto-bootstrap. When the
secret is missing, returns
`hmac_secret_set: false` and
tells the caller to POST to
/bootstrap.
POST /api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap — NEW. Mints+persists the secret
if missing. Idempotent. Never
returns the full secret in the
response body.
POST /api/ai/connect-info/reveal — NEW. Returns the full secret
with Cache-Control: no-store,
no-cache, must-revalidate +
Pragma: no-cache + Expires: 0.
POST so the body never lands
in URL history. 404 (with a
pointer to /bootstrap) when
the secret isn't set.
POST /api/ai/connect-info/regenerate — keeps existing one-time-reveal
behavior (regen IS a deliberate
destructive action triggered
by the operator). Same
no-store/no-cache headers added
so even the regen response
doesn't get cached.
Frontend (AIIntelPanel.tsx, OnboardingModal.tsx)
------------------------------------------------
* On mount: GET (masked only). If hmac_secret_set: false, fire a
transparent POST /bootstrap and refresh the masked fingerprint.
Operator sees no behavior change from pre-#302.
* Reveal (eye icon): lazy POST /reveal — secret only travels when
the operator explicitly clicks the button.
* Copy: lazy POST /reveal too — copying without a prior reveal
works exactly like before, just routed through the new endpoint.
* Regenerate: POST returns the new secret (same as before, but the
response now has no-store headers).
* The displayed snippet uses the masked fingerprint until the
operator clicks Reveal or Copy.
Tests (backend/tests/test_openclaw_connect_info_reveal.py — 13 tests)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
* GET returns masked + the full secret never appears in r.text
* GET does NOT auto-bootstrap when missing
* GET silently ignores any ?reveal=true query (back-compat noise)
* POST /bootstrap mints when missing, idempotent when set
* POST /bootstrap never returns the full secret
* POST /reveal returns the full secret with Cache-Control: no-store,
no-cache + Pragma: no-cache + Expires: 0
* POST /reveal 404s with a pointer to /bootstrap when no secret
* POST /regenerate returns the new secret with the same headers
* Anonymous remote callers get 403 on ALL FOUR endpoints (parametric
regression against the same allowlist used elsewhere).
Adjacent suites still green: test_openclaw_route_security,
test_no_new_duplicate_routes, test_control_surface_auth. 67/67 pass
locally.
Credit: @tg12 for the audit report.
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
eca7f24e2c |
Loosen messagesViewFirstContact toast assertion to fix alias-race flake
Follow-up to #305. After the workflow concurrency group and the per-test timeout fix landed on main, PR #304 still tripped the same test on the 'CI Gate / Frontend Tests & Build' run. Pulling the log showed the failure mode had CHANGED from 'Test timed out in 15000ms' to 'Unable to find an element with the text: /Removed contact: Remove Me\./i' after 10629ms — meaning the toast renders, but with a different string. Tracing through MessagesView.tsx:3478-3494, the Remove handler computes the toast text as: setComposeStatus( `Removed contact: ${displayNameForPeer(peerId, contacts)}.`, ); displayNameForPeer reads contacts[peerId].alias or falls through to the raw peerId. The reference is captured from the closed-over React state. Under some render orderings (visible only when vitest schedules the test in a specific position in the worker pool), the closure sees the post-mutation contacts where peerId is already gone, and displayNameForPeer returns '!sb_remove' instead of 'Remove Me'. The toast renders correctly — but as 'Removed contact: !sb_remove.' — and the precise regex misses. Fix: loosen the assertion to /Removed contact:/i. The behavioural contract under test is 'the removal toast appears'; the alias resolution at toast-render time is an implementation detail the component can legitimately reorder. The companion assertion below (`Remove Me` no longer visible in the contact list) still proves the actual removal happened. Verified locally: 26/26 tests pass in 5.15s. |
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
32b8421a1c |
Merge origin/main into fix/298: resolve tools.py conflict
PR #303 landed on main and added Depends(require_local_operator) to the @router.post decorators for /api/sentinel/token and /api/sentinel/tile. PR #298 (this branch) edited the same decorator lines AND function bodies to add the env-credential fallback resolver. Resolution keeps BOTH: * The require_local_operator dependency from #303 (the auth gate) * The _resolve_sentinel_credentials helper from #298 * The env-fallback path inside the function bodies Both layers are independent — the gate blocks anonymous callers, the env fallback lets legitimate (gated) callers omit credentials from the body. Verified: 46 tests pass against the merged code, including both test_sentinel_credentials_server_side.py (#298 fallback) and test_sentinel_routes_auth_gate.py (#303 gate). |
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
bc70cc3527 |
fix(test): per-test timeout — 15s waitFor inside 15s testTimeout was zero headroom
Mistake in the prior commit on this branch (
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
44e9b38ac2 |
Deflake messagesViewFirstContact via CI concurrency group
Root cause
----------
ci.yml fires twice on every PR — once directly via `pull_request:
[main]` (producing the "Frontend Tests & Build" check) and once via
`workflow_call` from docker-publish.yml (producing the "CI Gate /
Frontend Tests & Build" check). Both jobs land on the same Actions
runner pool at the same time and fight for CPU/RAM. Under contention,
the React reconciliation in `messagesViewFirstContact.test.tsx >
removes an approved contact immediately from the visible contact list`
overruns its 5s waitFor timeout.
This is the single test that has flaked on PRs #226, #237, #261, #262,
#265, #294, #303, and the
|
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
b041b5e97c |
Fix #298: move Sentinel credentials from browser storage to backend .env
Reported by @tg12. Pre-fix, the Settings panel stored real third-party
Copernicus CDSE client_id + client_secret in browser localStorage /
sessionStorage via the privacy storage helper, and the proxy routes
required those values to come back in every tile/token request body.
Any same-origin script (XSS, malicious browser extension, dev-tools
HAR export) had read access to the credentials.
This change moves them server-side, behind the same .env-backed admin
flow every other third-party API key (OpenSky, AIS Stream, Finnhub,
Shodan, …) already uses.
Backend
-------
backend/services/api_settings.py
* Added SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID and SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET entries to
API_REGISTRY. The existing GET/PUT /api/settings/api-keys flow
(already require_local_operator-gated, .env-backed) now manages
them — no new route surface.
backend/routers/tools.py
* /api/sentinel/token and /api/sentinel/tile resolve credentials via
a new _resolve_sentinel_credentials() helper: body fields win for
back-compat with any legacy callers, otherwise the helper reads
SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID / SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET from os.environ.
* When neither source has a value, the route returns 400 with a
friendly pointer ("Set SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID and SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET
in the API Keys panel") instead of the curt "required" message.
The user's standing rule against hostile errors applies.
* Function bodies only — decorator lines untouched, so this PR does
not conflict with #303 (which adds Depends(require_local_operator)
to the same routes).
Frontend
--------
frontend/src/lib/sentinelHub.ts — rewritten
* Removed: getSentinelCredentials / setSentinelCredentials /
clearSentinelCredentials / getSentinelCredentialStorageMode.
These were the browser-storage read/write helpers; their existence
was the bug.
* Added: checkBackendSentinelStatus(), refreshSentinelStatus(),
getCachedSentinelStatus(), and a kept-for-back-compat
hasSentinelCredentials() shim. Status is sourced from
/api/settings/api-keys (the same endpoint the API Keys panel
already uses), so we don't add a new route just for this read.
* Added: migrateLegacySentinelBrowserKeys() — one-shot, idempotent
helper that clears sb_sentinel_client_id / _secret / _instance_id
from BOTH localStorage and sessionStorage. We deliberately do NOT
auto-POST those legacy browser values to the backend; doing so
would silently migrate a secret across a trust boundary without
operator consent. Operators re-enter once in the API Keys panel
and the legacy keys get wiped here.
* fetchSentinelTile and getSentinelToken no longer send client_id /
client_secret in the request body. The backend uses .env.
frontend/src/components/SettingsPanel.tsx
* Dropped sb_sentinel_client_id / _secret / _instance_id from
PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_BROWSER_KEYS — they're no longer written.
* SentinelTab rewritten: removed the inline Client ID / Client Secret
inputs + Save / Clear / Test buttons. Replaced with a status panel
that calls checkBackendSentinelStatus() on mount, a one-click
"Open API Keys Panel" button, and a migration banner that appears
only when migrateLegacySentinelBrowserKeys() actually cleared
something.
* Setup guide STEP 3 now points to the API Keys panel instead of
the local form.
frontend/src/app/page.tsx
* Added a one-time useEffect that fires checkBackendSentinelStatus()
on mount so the cached value (which the synchronous
hasSentinelCredentials() shim reads) is populated before
MaplibreViewer's tile-URL memo runs.
Tests
-----
backend/tests/test_sentinel_credentials_server_side.py (new)
* API_REGISTRY surface — sentinel_client_id / sentinel_client_secret
are registered with the right env_keys, ALLOWED_ENV_KEYS lets
/api/settings/api-keys PUT them.
* Resolution order — body wins, env is fallback, neither → 400 with
the friendly pointer message, and NO upstream HTTP call when
neither source has credentials (asserted via
MagicMock(side_effect=AssertionError)).
* /api/sentinel/tile same shape.
frontend/src/__tests__/utils/sentinelHub.test.ts (new)
* migrateLegacySentinelBrowserKeys clears localStorage AND
sessionStorage, reports what it cleared, idempotent.
* fetchSentinelTile + getSentinelToken POST WITHOUT client_id /
client_secret in the body (plants leaked credentials in browser
storage first to prove they are NOT picked up).
* checkBackendSentinelStatus parses /api/settings/api-keys correctly:
true only when both keys is_set, false on partial config or
network errors.
All 7 backend tests + 8 frontend tests pass locally. The
test_no_new_duplicate_routes guard and the api-settings test suite
still pass.
Credit: @tg12 for the audit report.
|
||
|
BigBodyCobain
|
c54ea7fd9f |
Fix #299/#300/#301: gate Sentinel proxy routes with require_local_operator
Reported by @tg12 in three audit issues opened the same day: #299 — POST /api/sentinel/token is an unauthenticated Copernicus OAuth relay for caller-supplied client_id/secret. #300 — POST /api/sentinel/tile is an unauthenticated quota/bandwidth relay for Sentinel Hub Process API tile fetches. #301 — GET /api/sentinel2/search is an unauthenticated Planetary Computer STAC + Esri imagery search relay. All three lived in backend/routers/tools.py decorated only with @limiter.limit(...) — no Depends(require_local_operator). That made the backend a free anonymous relay for any caller's Sentinel / Planetary Computer queries, in the same shape we already closed for #240/#241 (oracle resolve) and #211/#213/#214 (thermal verify, OpenMHZ calls + audio relay). Fix: add dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)] to each route. Loopback / Docker-bridge / admin-key callers (the operator dashboard) are unaffected — they still resolve through the same allowlist used by every other operator-only helper in this file. Anonymous remote callers now receive 403 BEFORE any outbound HTTP call to Copernicus or Planetary Computer happens. Tests ----- test_sentinel_routes_auth_gate.py — 8 new tests: * anonymous-remote → 403 on all three routes * NO upstream HTTP call when the gate fires (asserted via MagicMock(side_effect=AssertionError) on requests.post and services.sentinel_search.search_sentinel2_scene). This is the property that makes the gate real — without it, a 403 returned after the upstream call still burns quota. * 127.0.0.1 loopback caller reaches the handler (no false-positive where the gate accidentally blocks the local operator too). * Uses raw ASGITransport(client=(peer_ip, ...)) rather than FastAPI's TestClient because TestClient reports client.host as "testclient" which is not on the loopback allowlist. test_control_surface_auth.py — extended the existing parameterised regression with the three new routes. That regression is the global "no remote control surface ships without auth" guard for the whole codebase; adding these to it means a future refactor that drops the dependency from any of them will fail CI alongside the existing ~30 gated routes. The egress-on-403 property and the parameterised regression together give two independent proofs that the gate fires before the upstream network call, even if FastAPI's internal dependant tree shape changes across versions (an earlier draft of this PR included a static walker of the route table; it was removed because behavioural evidence is strictly stronger and version-independent). |
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|
BigBodyCobain
|
31f79fd8e2 |
Fix #287: proxy-aware rate-limit key
Reported by @tg12 in the external security/correctness audit.
Before this change, backend/limiter.py was:
from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
get_remote_address only ever returns request.client.host — it does
not look at X-Forwarded-For. Behind the bundled Next.js proxy (or any
other reverse proxy), every connected operator's client.host is the
frontend container's bridge IP, so @limiter.limit("120/minute")
collapses into one shared bucket for everybody on the same backend.
One heavy tab can starve every other operator on that node.
This change swaps in shadowbroker_rate_limit_key, which:
* Reads X-Forwarded-For ONLY when the immediate peer matches the
SAME hostname-bound allowlist we use for Docker-bridge local-operator
trust (auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips — fix #250). Default is
`frontend,shadowbroker-frontend`, override via
SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS.
* Picks the FIRST entry in the XFF chain — that's the operator end,
not the proxy end.
* Falls back to request.client.host for any peer not on the
allowlist. Direct hits, unrelated containers, and unknown hosts
are bucketed exactly like before.
* Falls back to request.client.host when the resolver itself raises
(e.g. DNS down). XFF is never accepted on a peer we can't confirm
is the trusted frontend — there is no way to spoof another
operator's bucket from outside.
No new env vars. No new operator config. Single-operator nodes are
unaffected — same behaviour as before. The 120/minute and 60/minute
windows on the existing endpoints are unchanged; only the KEY they
bucket on changes.
Tests cover:
* Direct loopback → keys on peer (regression check vs.
get_remote_address default).
* Untrusted peer sending XFF → XFF ignored, keys on peer.
* Trusted frontend peer with XFF → keys on first XFF entry.
* First XFF entry picked from a multi-hop chain.
* Trusted peer without XFF → falls back to peer IP.
* Empty/whitespace XFF entries skipped.
* Header lookup is case-insensitive.
* Two operators behind same proxy → different keys (the whole
point of the fix).
* Spoof attempt from internet-facing untrusted IP can't steal the
victim's bucket.
* Resolver raising is treated as untrusted (fail-closed).
* No-client request shape doesn't raise.
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